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Human decision making can be influenced by emotionally valenced contexts, known as
the framing effect. We used event-related brain potentials to investigate how framing
influences the encoding of reward. We found that the feedback related negativity (FRN),
which indexes the “worse than expected” negative prediction error in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), was more negative for the negative frame than for the positive
frame in the win domain. Consistent with previous findings that the FRN is not sensitive
to “better than expected” positive prediction error, the FRN did not differentiate the
positive and negative frame in the loss domain. Our results provide neural evidence that
the description invariance principle which states that reward representation and decision
making are not influenced by how options are presented is violated in the framing effect.
Keywords: framing effect, reward, ACC, ERP, FRN
INTRODUCTION
People make decisions based on their mental representations of
problems or options. Theories of rational choice argue that the
same option will be evaluated in the same way, regardless of how
the option is described; thus, equivalent descriptions should lead
to identical decisions, known as the description invariance princi-
ple. For example, in the expected utility theory, choice options are
strictly evaluated as a function of probability and magnitude with
no specification of how probability and magnitude are described
(Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). However, both in real-world
situations and in the laboratory, there are many cases that vio-
late the description invariance principle. The same situation may
be seen in different ways depending on how it is described. As
commonly known, the glass can be described as half full or half
empty and be perceived as either positive or negative. Studies have
shown that beef described as “75% lean” was given higher rat-
ings and tasted better than beef described as “25% fat” (Levin and
Gaeth, 1988). Teams are allocated more funds when their perfor-
mance rates are framed in terms of successes rather than failures
(Duchon et al., 1989).
In the famous Asian disease problem, participants have to
choose between two programs to combat the disease. It has been
shown that if the description is in terms of affectively positive
aspects, that is, the option is the prospect of saving 200 lives
out of 600 lives (safe option) vs. saving 600 people with one-
third probability and no people with two-third probability (risky
option), then risk aversion usually results; if the description is
in terms of affectively negative aspects, namely, the option is
400 out of 600 will die and with one-third probability nobody
will die vs. with two-third probability 600 people will die, then
risk seeking ensues (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kühberger
and Gradl, 2011). These two logically equivalent but descrip-
tively different frames led to substantial differences in people’s
choices. Thus, rating of a single option is reversed depending on
the valence emphasis of outcome description even though those
presentations are logically equivalent, termed the “framing effect”
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
Prospect Theory accounts for the framing effect as a con-
sequence of the decision-maker coding positive descriptions as
gains and negative descriptions as losses, inducing risk averse
and risk seeking preferences respectively (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981). It predicts that subjective evaluations of options are
changed based on descriptions. However, preference reversal at
the behavioral level does not always imply description invari-
ance violation. Some argue that the framing simply influences
individuals’ reasoning process and the construal of the logical
content of the problem. For example, the Fuzzy-Trace Theory
(FTT) proposes that rather than processing quantitative data,
decision makers develop a qualitative representation of the prob-
lem (Reyna and Brainerd, 1991; Reyna and Ellis, 1994). In the
Asian Disease problem, options may be constructed as: Program
A is “Some people will be saved;” Program B is “Some people will
be saved or no one will be saved;” Program C is “Some people will
die” and Program D is “Nobody will die or some people will die.”
Given that “Some people will be saved” is common to A and B,
the unique “. . . no one will be saved” in B shifts preference to A;
on the other hand, with C and D, the “. . . some people will die” is
common while the unique “Nobody will die” shifts preference to
D. According to the FTT, description invariance is not necessarily
violated. Because decision making operates on simplified rather
than on exact numerical information, the framing effect occurs
(Kuhberger and Tanner, 2010).
Whether frames influence initial option evaluation or subse-
quent reasoning or both is still an open question. A seminal study
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) revealed
that activity in the amygdala was enhanced when subjects
chose in accordance with the frame effect, whereas enhanced
activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was observed
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when subjects’ choices ran counter to their general behavioral
tendency (De Martino et al., 2006). Since a large number of
studies have shown that individuals are risk seeking in wins and
risk aversion in losses, the general behavioral tendency would be
more likely to choose sure options in the positive domain and
more likely to choose gamble options in the negative domain,
whereas running counter to such tendency would be making
opposite choices. Thus, the interaction between decision and
frame (Positive_sure—Negative_gamble)—(Positive_gamble—
Negative sure) represents the general behavioral tendency, i.e.,
framing effect (De Martino et al., 2006). These findings suggest
that frames influence the decision-making stage. However, it is
still unknown whether and how the initial evaluation of stimuli
is also influenced by frames.
Our study focuses on the initial option evaluation using
high temporal resolution event related brain potentials (ERP).
Previous studies have shown that reward processing is very rapid,
at around 250ms after stimulus presentation (Miltner et al.,
1997; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd and Coles, 2002;
Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Goyer et al., 2008). It is important to
know whether framing influences early stage rapid reward pro-
cessing or it only influences later stage reward processing. In the
early stage, only the most important aspects of outcome, such as
valence andmagnitude, are processed (Toyomaki andMurohashi,
2005; Holroyd et al., 2006). In the late stage, more contextual
information, such as the value relative to expectation and social
comparison, are integrated (Peterburs et al., 2013). Behavioral
studies show that even after participants are aware of the framing
effect, they still show robust framing bias (Schick, 1992), suggest-
ing that the framing effect might happen automatically at a very
early stage.
Using ERP, we examine how positive and negative frames are
evaluated in both the win and the loss domain. Here, domain
means the valence of reward, e.g., wins or losses, whereas frames
represent how the advantage of the option (positive) or the disad-
vantage of the option (negative) is emphasized in the description.
It has been emphasized that findings obtained studying prefer-
ences in the domain of gains should not be immediately general-
ized to the domain of losses (Tymula et al., 2013). For example,
on average people are much more risk- and ambiguity-tolerant
in losses than in gains and these preferences are not correlated
with each other (Zhou and Wu, 2011; Tymula et al., 2012, 2013).
Individuals were more sensitive to unfairness in the loss domain
than in the win domain (Zhou and Wu, 2011; Wu et al., 2014).
Thus, it is important to study the neural mechanisms underlying
framing effect in both domains.
The feedback related negativity (FRN), an ERP compo-
nent that peaks at around 250ms after feedback onset, has
been found to be sensitive to the valence of outcomes, being
more pronounced for negative feedback associated with unfa-
vorable outcome, such as incorrect response or monetary loss,
than for positive feedback (Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002). The FRN is maximal at frontal-central scalp
electrode sites and is generally believed to be generated at the
ACC (Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002).
One theory suggests that the FRN reflects the processes of
assessing the motivational/affective impact of outcome events,
i.e., the processes of putting subjective values onto outcomes
(Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004).
Another influential hypothesis posits that the FRN is elicited by
the negative reward prediction error (i.e., “the result is worse than
expected”) (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). The negative reward pre-
diction error signal, which is associated with decreased dopamin-
ergic neurons activity, disinhibits ACC neurons, thereby produc-
ing the cortical error signal (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). Recent
studies have shown that the FRN is not only sensitive to monetary
outcomes (Dunning and Hajcak, 2007; Bellebaum et al., 2010; Yu
et al., 2011). It has been shown that the FRN could be elicited
by predictive cues presented prior to feedbacks (Dunning and
Hajcak, 2007; Yu et al., 2011). Other studies found that the FRN
encodes unfair proposals compared to fair proposals (Boksem
and De Cremer, 2010; Campanha et al., 2011; Pfabigan et al.,
2011; Osinsky et al., 2013). We predicted that the FRN would
be more negative for the negative frames than for the positive
frames in the win domain. Since the FRN is more sensitive to
“worse than expected” negative prediction error than to “better
than expected” positive prediction error, we predicted that the
influence of framing on FRN would be significant in the win
domain but not in the loss domain. In the loss domain, there is
little room to be “worse than expected” since losses are already
the worst outcomes. The P300, which is the most positive peak
in the 200–600ms time window post-onset of feedback, has also
been shown to be sensitive to the valence of reward (Hajcak et al.,
2005; Wu and Zhou, 2009). We predicted that the P300 would be
more positive for the positive frame than the negative frame and
be more positive for wins than losses.
To investigate the effects of framing on reward processing
in the human brain, we conducted the experiment with the
electroencephalogram (EEG) being recorded when participants
performed the framing task (see Figure 1). In Experiment 1, we
confirmed that framing influences decision making in both the
win and the loss domain, when wins and losses trials are sepa-
rated into different block. In order to replicate our findings and
to further investigate possible interaction between domains and
frames, in Experiment 2, we examined these effects when win and
loss trials were mixed.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Eighteen undergraduate students (11 males; mean age ± SD,
20.4± 1.3 years) participated in Experiment 1 and 14 under-
graduate students (7 males; mean age ± SD, 21.7± 2.2 years)
participated in Experiment 2. All the participants were right-
handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were
screened for neurological or psychiatric disorders. The study
was approved by the Academic Committee of the School of
Psychology at South China Normal University. All participants
gave written, informed consent and were informed of their right
to discontinue participation at any time.
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
Before the experiment, the subjects were familiarized with the
decision-making task, and given ten practice trials.
At the beginning of each trial, participants were shown a mes-
sage (for 1000ms) indicating the starting amount of money that
they would receive. Subjects were instructed that they would not
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental task design. At the beginning of each trial, a
message indicating the starting amount of money was presented for
1000ms. The amount is a win in the win domain (A) and a loss in the loss
domain (B). The participants were informed that they may or may not
receive this initial amount of money, depending on their subsequent
choices. Then a sure option was showed in the left of the screen for
1000ms. The sure option was framed either positive or negative in both
domains. After that, a gamble option, that is, a pie chart depicting the
probability of winning (i.e., keep all initial reward in the win domain or lose
nothing in the loss domain) or losing (i.e., receive nothing in the win domain
or lose the initial amount in the loss domain) was showed in the right of the
screen for 2000ms. Participants are required to make a decision within the
2000ms.
be able to retain the whole of this initial amount, but would next
have to choose between a sure and a gamble option. Then the
sure option was presented for 1000ms. In the win block, the sure
amount was framed as the amount participants would keep of
the initial endowment in the positive frame condition (“ ” in
Chinese) or as the amount participants would lose of the ini-
tial endowment in the negative frame (“ ” in Chinese). In
the loss block, the sure amount was framed as the amount par-
ticipants would save in the positive frame (“ ” in Chinese)
or as the amount participants would still lose in the negative
frame (“ ” in Chinese). Participants were then asked to choose
between a sure option and a gamble option presented in the
context of two different frames. The gamble option was shown
as a pie chart depicting the probability of winning or losing
in each trial. Participants in the win domain block were told
that they would gain all initial money if they won the gamble
and would gain nothing if they lost the gamble. In the loss
domain block, they would lose no money if they won the gam-
ble and would lose the entire amount at stake if they lost the
gamble. The two alternatives were presented in succession. The
sure option was presented on the left side of the screen and the
gamble option was presented on the right side of the screen.
Participants were given 2 s to respond by pressing the left or right
button. They were also told that during the task they would not
receive feedback concerning the outcomes of their decisions (see
Figure 1).
They would be awarded or penalized according to their deci-
sion at the end of the experiment. Four different starting amounts
were used in the experiment (25, 50, 75, and 100). There
were four different probabilities of winning or losing in a given
trial (20, 40, 60, and 80%). In the two blocks, the starting amounts
and the probabilities of winning or losing were both fully bal-
anced between the frame conditions. The order of the win and
loss block was counterbalanced across participants and other
experimental conditions were randomized within the blocks.
There was a short break after every 128 trials. Participants were
told that their performance in the task determined how much
they would be awarded at the end of the experiment. One trial
in the win domain (with an initial win amount) and one trial
in the loss domain (with an initial loss amount) were randomly
chosen and implemented. If the final outcome is losing, partici-
pants received no reward. Thus, losing money means winning no
money in the end. Because it is not ethic to ask participants to pay
out of pocket money in the experiments, randomly choosing one
win trial and one loss trial allows participants being motivated to
win more and avoid losses. Participants knew they could actually
lose money from their base payment and from the money won in
the win domain. All the participants received a base payment of
60 yuan (about 10 US dollars) plus any extra reward if they won
or lost.
EEG RECORDING AND ANALYSIS
EEGs were recorded from 64 scalp sites using Ag/AgCl electrodes
embedded in an elastic cap (NeuroScan Inc., USA) according to
the international 10–20 system, with the reference to the right
mastoid. Eye blinks were recorded from electrodes located above
and below the left eye. The horizontal electro-oculogram (EOG)
was recorded from electrodes placed 1.5 cm lateral to the left and
right external canthi. The EEGs were re-referenced offline to the
linkedmastoids. All electrode impedances weremaintained below
5 k. The EEG and EOGwere amplified using a 0.05–70Hz band-
pass and continuously sampled at 500Hz/channel for off-line
analysis.
Ocular artifacts were corrected with an eye-movement correc-
tion algorithm using a linear regression approach (Gratton et al.,
1983). The data were filtered using a 20Hz low-pass (24 dB octave
roll off), and were baseline corrected by subtracting from each
sample the average activity of that channel during the baseline
period. For the FRN, a further 1Hz high-pass filter was used to
minimize the influence of P300 on detecting the FRN (Talmi et al.,
2012). EEG epochs of 800ms (with 200ms pre-stimulus base-
line) were extracted off-line for ERPs time-locked to the onset of
framing conditions. All trials in which EEG voltages exceeded a
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threshold of ±70 AV during the recording epoch were excluded
from analysis.
According to visual inspection of ERP waveforms, the FRN
was measured as the mean amplitudes in the time window of
200–300ms post-onset of the sure option of different frames. The
P300 was measured as the mean value in the 300–500ms time
window on each electrode. We focused on the FRN responses on
the anterior frontal midline electrode Fz and the P300 responses
on the posterior midline electrode Pz, since the FRN effects and
the P300 effects were the largest on these electrodes, respectively.
The Mauchly test assesses the validity of the sphericity assump-
tion. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were used when sphericity
was violated. Alpha level for all tests was 0.05. The procedure
used in Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1 except that
the four experimental conditions (win_positive, win_negative,
loss_positive, and loss_negative) were fully randomized rather
than separated into different blocks. We also used smaller number
of trials in Experiment 2 (256 trials in total) than in Experiment
1 (512 trials in total), with 128 win trials and 128 loss trials.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL FRAMING EFFECT
A Two Way repeated measures ANOVA using the domain
(win/loss) and the frame (positive/negative) as independent fac-
tors and the percentage of gambling choice as dependent factor
was performed to analyze the data. As expected, in Experiment
1, using block design, participants revealed a preference for gam-
ble choices in the negative frame compared to the positive frame,
F(1, 17) = 12.1, p = 0.003(see Figure 2A). There was no signifi-
cant difference between the win and loss domain, F(1, 17) = 1.7,
p = 0.213. The interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 17) =
2.6, p = 0.123. Furthermore, no significant effects were found for
RTs [for the main effect of frame, F(1, 17) = 0.1, p = 0.771; for
the main effect of domain, F(1, 17) = 0.5, p = 0.502; for the inter-
action effect, F(1, 17) = 0.9, p = 0.370]. In addition, the starting
amount (25, 50, 75, 100) together with the behavioral
results for both frame conditions were included as factors in a
4× 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) in the win domain and the
loss domain separately. A similar ANOVA was performed for the
different percentages of the amount offered (20, 40, 60, 80%). No
effect of initial reward magnitude or reward probability in the
gambling options was found, p > 0.05.
In Experiment 2, using a mixed design, we found simi-
lar behavioral patterns. The frequency of gamble choices was
significantly higher in the negative frame than in the posi-
tive frame [F(1, 13) = 75.2, p < 0.001] (see Figure 2B). There
was no significant difference between win and loss domain,
F(1, 13) = 0.5, p = 0.486. The interaction effect was also not
significant, F(1, 13) = 0.2, p = 0.705. The reaction times were
not affected by frame conditions, F(1, 13) = 0.1, p = 0.797. The
main effect of domain was marginally significant, F(1, 13) = 3.4,
p = 0.087. The RTs for decisions in the win domain (mean ±
SE, 722.5ms ± 52.9) were faster than the RTs in the loss domain
(mean ± SE, 766.6ms ± 62.2). The interaction effect of RT
was not significant, F(1, 13) = 0.03, p = 0.854. No effect of initial
reward magnitude or reward probability in the gambling options
was found, p > 0.05.
FRN EFFECT (1–20 Hz BAND-PASS)
Each of the 18 participants in Experiment 1 had at least 120
trials and each of the 14 participants in Experiment 2 had 60 tri-
als in each condition for EEG averaging. The group waveforms
for 4 experimental conditions after 1–20Hz band-pass filtering
were plotted in Figures 3A,B. we performed a repeated-measures
ANOVA with the factors domain (win or loss) and frame (pos-
itive or negative). The mean amplitude of FRN on the electrode
FZ in the 200–300ms time window and the mean values of P300
on the electrode PZ in the 300–500ms time window were entered
into repeated ANOVA analysis. The main effect of domain on the
FRN was significant, F(1, 17) = 4.5, p = 0.048, FRNs in the win
block were more negative (mean ± SE, 2.5µV ± 0.3) than those
in the loss block (mean ± SE, 3.1µV ± 0.3). The main effect
of frame was not significant, F(1, 17) = 1.6, p = 0.228. The inter-
action effect was significant, F(1, 17) = 4.5, p = 0.049. Pairwise
t-tests on simple effects showed that in the win block, FRNs in
the negative frame (mean ± SE, 2.3µV ± 0.3) were more nega-
tive than FRNs in the positive frame (mean ± SE, 2.8µV ± 0.3),
t(17) = 2.2, p = 0.04. However, there was no significant differ-
ence between the positive and negative frames in the loss domain,
t(17) = −0.3, p = 0.766 (see Figures 2C, 3A). These results sug-
gest that the positive/negative framing effect on FRN only exists
in the win domain. Moreover, in order to control for the possi-
ble effect of magnitude on the in the observed frame × domain
interaction, an ANOVA with domain (win or loss), frame (posi-
tive or negative) and magnitude (low [25, 50] or high [75,
100]) as independent factors revealed a significant main effect
of domain, F(1, 17) = 4.5, p = 0.048 and a significant interaction
effect between domain and frame, F(1, 17) = 4.5, p = 0.048. No
other effects were significant, p > 0.1.
In Experiment 2, the FRN results revealed a significant fram-
ing × domain interaction effect, F(1, 13) = 4.9, p = 0.046. The
main effect of framing or domain was not significant, F(1, 13) =
2.0, p = 0178, F(1, 13) = 0.4, p = 0.538, respectively. Pairwise t-
tests on simple effects suggested that in the win domain, FRN
being more negative to the negative frame (mean± SE, 1.8µV±
0.3) than to the positive frame (mean± SE, 2.6µV± 0.5), t(13) =
2.3, p = 0.039. However, in the loss domain, there was no signif-
icant difference between the two types of frames, t(13) = 0.7, p =
0.515 (see Figures 2D, 3B). Since there were not enough trials
(less than 20) to analyze the data to investigate the effect of mag-
nitude, we did not add the magnitude factor to analyze the data.
The same analyses were conducted for the average magnitude
of FRN on the electrode CZ. In Experiment 1, The main effect
of domain was significant, F(1, 17) = 4.9, p = 0.041, FRNs in the
win block were more negative (mean ± SE, 2.0µV ± 0.4) than
those in the loss block (mean± SE, 2.6µV± 0.3). Themain effect
of frame was not significant, F(1, 17) = 1.0, p = 0.323. The fram-
ing × domain interaction effect was significant, F(1, 17) = 8.0,
p = 0.011. Pairwise t-tests on simple effects showed that in the
win block, FRNs in the negative frame (mean± SE, 2.2µV± 0.4)
were more negative than FRNs in the positive frame (mean± SE,
1.8µV ± 0.4), t(17) = 2.2, p = 0.04. However, there was no sig-
nificant difference between the positive and negative frames in the
loss domain, t(17) = −0.4, p = 0.690. In Experiment 2, there was
no significant main effect of domain F(1, 13) = 0.03, p = 0.866,
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FIGURE 2 | Behavioral and ERP results. In Experiment 1 (A) and
Experiment 2 (B), the frequency of gamble choices (mean, SE) is
significant higher in negative frame than in the positive frame,
regardless of domain. In both Experiment 1 (C) and Experiment 2 (D),
the FRN was more negative in the negative frame than in the positive
frame only in the win domain but not in the loss domain.
and no significant interaction effect, F(1, 13) = 2.1, p = 0.169.
The main effect of frame approached significant, F(1, 13) = 3.9,
p = 0.089. The difference waveforms and corresponding topo-
graphical maps were shown in Figure 4.
The measurement of the FRN may be confounded by the
P300 effect. To deal with this issue, we measured the P300
after using the same 1–20Hz band-pass filtering. Since the
FRN is consisted of bursts of activity in the 4–7Hz frequency
range (Willoughby and Gehring, 2004; Cohen et al., 2007) and
the long-duration component P300 is in the frequency range
(<3Hz) (Ford et al., 2008), high-pass filtering (1Hz) can min-
imize the P300 effect while preserve the FRN effect. Here, the
P300 was measured as the mean amplitude of 300–500ms time
window. In Experiment 1, the main effect of domain on P300
was not significant, P > 0.05. The main effect of domain and
the interaction effect were not significant (p values > 0.3). In
Experiment 2, the main effect of frame, the main effect of
domain, and the interaction effect were all not significant (p val-
ues > 0.1). Thus, the P300 showed different patterns from the
FRN. These results suggest that the observed FRN effect in the
present experiments cannot simply be explained by the P300
effect. No significant correlation was found between the FRN
effect and the behavioral framing effect, possibly due to the small
sample size.
P300 EFFECT (20 Hz LOW-PASS)
The group waveforms for 4 experimental conditions after 20Hz
low-pass filtering were plotted in Figures 3C,D. In Experiment 1,
the main effect of frame on P300 was significant, F(1, 17) =
10.5, p = 0.005. The P300 was more positive in the positive
frame (mean ± SE, 7.9µV ± 0.6) than in the negative frame
(mean ± SE, 7.1µV ± 0.7). The main effect of domain was not
significant, F(1, 17) = 1.6, p = 0.221. The interaction effect was
not significant, F(1, 17) = 2.5, p = 0.13.
In Experiment 2, the main effect of frame on P300 was
marginally significant, F(1, 13) = 4.0, p = 0.067. The P300 was
more positive in the positive frame (mean ± SE, 4.1µV ± 1.2)
than in the negative frame (mean ± SE, 3.7µV ± 1.3). The
main effect of domain was also marginally significant, F(1, 13) =
3.4, p = 0.088. The P300 in the loss domain (mean ± SE,
4.2µV ± 1.3) was more positive than that in the win domain
(mean± SE, 3.6µV± 1.3). The interaction effect was not signif-
icant, F(1, 13) < 1. The difference waveforms and corresponding
topographical maps were shown in Figure 5.
DISCUSSION
Across two experiments, we demonstrate robust framing effect in
both the win and the loss domains. Framing influences choices in
both domains: subjects are more risk averse in the positive frame
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FIGURE 3 | The ERP grand-average waveforms. In Experiment 1
(A) and Experiment 2 (B), grand-average waveforms from channel
FZ using 1–20Hz band-pass filtered for four experimental conditions
(win_positive, win_negative, loss_positive, loss_negative) were shown.
Similar waveforms were plotted for ERP at channel PZ using 20Hz
low-pass filtered (C,D). The shaded 200–300 and 300–500ms time
window were used to measure the FRN and P300 magnitude,
respectively.
and more risk seeking in the negative frame, both in the domain
of wins and losses. Importantly, our ERP studies show that the
initial evaluations of the positive and the negative frame differ
within 300ms in the win domain. However, in both ERP studies,
we did not find significant ERP difference between the two differ-
ently valenced frames in the loss domain, even though behavioral
framing effects were significant.
Our results lend some neural support to the prospect theory
accounts of framing effect which posits that positive frames are
encoded as gains whereas negative frames are encoded as losses,
suggesting that the description invariance principle is indeed vio-
lated in the framing paradigm. Two descriptions, “keep 60”
and “lose 40” when the initial amount is 100, represented the
identical option, but elicited distinct FRN and P300. The FRNwas
more negative for “lose 40” than for “keep 60” even though
participants can easily reason that losing 40 out of 100 equals
keeping 60. According to the motivational accounts of the FRN
which suggest that the FRN is sensitive to the valence of out-
comes (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002), our data indicate that
negative frames are encoded as losses whereas positive frames
are encoded as gains in the win domain. The FRN effect can-
not simply be explained by the valence of the words we used.
For example, both words “keep” and “save” are positive but they
elicited distinct FRNs. Moreover, previous studies using pleasant
and unpleasant affectively valent words did not find differences
in the FRNs in the time window between 200 and 300ms post-
stimuli (Kiehl et al., 1999; Bernat et al., 2001). Our results on
P300 are also consistent with the view that the P300 is related
to processes of attentional allocation and to high-level motiva-
tional/affective evaluation, being more positive for more positive
stimuli (Olofsson et al., 2008). Thus, we provide direct neural
evidence that the description invariance principle is violated and
outcome evaluation depends on its representation. Our data favor
the prospect theory account of framing to other theories that
require deliberate reasoning.
It is surprising that the frame effect on FRN was only signifi-
cant in the win domain but not in the loss domain. One possibility
is that the negative frame in the win domain is encoded as “worse
than expected” negative prediction error, whereas the positive
frame in the loss domain is encoded as “better than expected”
positive prediction error, and the FRN is only sensitive to neg-
ative prediction error (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). It is possible
that when the initial amount is a gain, “lose 40” is encoded as
a loss and produces a “worse than expected” negative prediction
error. Previous studies have consistently shown that the FRN is
sensitive to the negative prediction error (Holroyd et al., 2003,
2008, 2009; Holroyd and Krigolson, 2007). However, findings
are mixed regarding whether the FRN is sensitive to the posi-
tive prediction error as well. Some studies have shown that the
FRN is sensitive to the positive prediction error but with much
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FIGURE 4 | The ERP difference waveforms and topograph (FRN). In Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B), difference waveforms (negative minus positive)
in the win domain and the loss domain were shown. The corresponding topographical maps (200–300, 50ms increment) were shown (C,D).
smaller magnitude, compared with its sensitivity to the nega-
tive prediction error (Oliveira et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2011). Some
studies found no effects of the positive prediction error on FRN
amplitude (Holroyd et al., 2003; Krigolson and Holroyd, 2007;
Bellebaum et al., 2010). It remains unclear why the ACC (or FRN
amplitude) appears to be less responsive to the positive predic-
tion error. A number of recent studies suggest that dopamine
and serotonin neuromodulators contribute differentially to cod-
ing for outcomes in the win and the loss domain, respectively.
For example, it has been shown that dopamine agonists affected
choices in the gain domain (both neurally and behaviorally) but
not the loss domain (Pessiglione et al., 2006). Genetic variation in
tonic dopamine and serotonin levels modifies risk seeking in gain
and loss domains, respectively (Zhong et al., 2009). Accordingly,
given that the FRN is believed to reflect a dopaminergic signal,
we should not be surprised to see that it only reflects negative
prediction error. Recent ERP studies also showed no significant
difference in the FRN for good and bad outcomes in the loss
domain (Kreussel et al., 2012; Sambrook et al., 2012). A recent
study demonstrated that size and probability of rewards mod-
ulate the FRN associated with wins but not losses (San Martin
et al., 2010). This might be due to a separation of dopamine
and serotonin coding functions in gain and loss domains. It is
also possible that different sub-regions in dopaminergic mid-
brain and the striatum encode different types of prediction error
and positive prediction error may not be sent to the ACC (Bayer
and Glimcher, 2005; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2010).
Our results contribute to a growing body of empirical evidence
showing a greater modulation of the FRN for win feedback in
comparison to loss feedback (Cohen et al., 2007; Holroyd et al.,
2008; San Martin et al., 2010). Our findings, if replicated, suggest
that different neural substrates may be involved in modulating
framing effect in the win and the loss domain. Although pre-
vious neuroimaging studies focus on the framing effect in the
win domain (De Martino et al., 2006; Roiser et al., 2009), the
neural correlate of the framing effect in the loss domain is still
unclear. There is accumulating evidence suggesting that the neu-
ral mechanisms underlying win and loss processing are different
(O’Doherty et al., 2001, 2003, 2006; Ullsperger and von Cramon,
2003; Kringelbach, 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Liu et al.,
2007). Other neuroimaging methods (e.g., fMRI) are needed to
further examine the neural basis of framing in the loss domain.
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FIGURE 5 | The ERP difference waveforms and topograph (P300). In Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B), difference waveforms (positive minus
negative) in the win domain and the loss domain were shown. The corresponding topographical maps (300–500ms, 100ms increment) were shown (C,D).
Previous neuroimaging studies on framing only focus on
the decision stage. Using the similar economic decision-making
paradigm, two studies compared choices in accordance with the
framing effect and choices against the framing effect at the deci-
sion stage (De Martino et al., 2006; Roiser et al., 2009). These
studies highlight the interplay between prefrontal cortex and
amygdala in framing effect. The ACC is interpreted as exerting
cognitive control over emotional response in amygdala. It has
been shown that choices made counter to, relative to those made
in accord with, the frame were associated with increased anterior
cingulate–amygdala coupling in individuals with homozygous
for the long (la) allele at the 5-HTTLPR (Roiser et al., 2009).
However, amygdala lesion patients did not show abnormal fram-
ing effect (Talmi et al., 2010), suggesting that the amygdala may
not play a causal role in framing, although it contributes to deci-
sion making in framing. Our findings suggest that the ACC may
not only contribute to framing effect by inhibiting amygdalar
activity, but is also involved in the motivational evaluation of
stimuli. Taken together, our findings suggest an important role
of the ACC in framing.
Another two fMRI studies on framing effect used the Asian
disease problem. One study compared risky choices with sure
option choices and found that the cognitive effort required to
select a sure gain was considerably lower than that required to
choose a risky gain in the positive frame but not in the nega-
tive frame (Gonzalez et al., 2005). Activation in frontal, parietal
areas differed between risky and certain choices, but only for the
positive and not for the negative frame. Another study compared
choices in the positive frame with choices in the negative frame
and found that choices in the positive frame were associated with
enhanced activity in inferior frontal gyrus, insula and parietal
lobe (Zheng et al., 2010). No significantly increased neural activ-
ity for choices in the negative frame was reported. Our findings
extend these studies by showing differential encoding of frame
before decisions are made.
It is worth noting that both behavioral and neural responses
to frame are different between the blocked design experiment
(Experiment 1) and themixed design experiment (Experiment 2),
suggesting that our experimental manipulation did influence
subjects’ behavioral and brain responses. In Experiment 2, as
Figure 2 shows, participants were generally more likely to gamble
across conditions, compared with their probability of gambling
in Experiment 1. When wins and losses were presented within
a block, the contrast between wins and losses became salient.
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This may induce a general loss aversion tendency and the risk-
seeking strategy to compensate loss aversion (i.e., gamble in
the hope to keep all wins and avoid all losses). Moreover, in
Experiment 2, the RTs for decisions in the win domain tended to
be faster than the RTs in the loss domain (p = 0.087), in contrast
with findings that there was no RT difference between domains in
Experiment 1. It is possible that when win and loss domains are
mixed, the switching between domains makes making decisions
about losses more difficult. For the ERP results, as Figures 2, 3
shows, the ERP amplitudes were overall smaller in Experiment 2
than in Exp eriment 1. The results may be attributable to indi-
vidual differences in these relatively small samples. Nevertheless,
themain effects of frames remain significant and consistent across
experiments, suggesting that our behavioral and ERP results are
stable. It is important to notice that the loss-associated FRNs were
not more negative than win-associated FRNs in the current study
probably because that participants already received win/loss feed-
back in the “initial amounts” stage. Thus, information in the “sure
amounts” stage does not provide additional information on the
win/loss dimension. The FRN may respond more to the framing
manipulation rather than to the already known win/loss dimen-
sion. Moreover, the ERP waveforms in Figures 2C,D show that
in the loss domain, both negative and positive frames were coded
as gains (i.e., they appear to be comparable in magnitude to the
“win_positive” condition and the “win_negative” condition). In
other words, when starting with an initial loss, it appears that
both frames are coded as relatively advantageous outcomes. The
ERP response here might be understood as the reward positivity
to predictive cues (Holroyd et al., 2011). While FRN ampli-
tude did not vary by frame valence in the loss domain, the fact
that these two conditions appear to be coded as gains might be
potentiallymeaningful. Future studiesmay further investigate this
phenomenon.
Some limitations in our study are worth mentioning. First,
although the ACC is generally believed to be the main genera-
tor of the FRN (Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and Willoughby,
2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Martin et al., 2009), our ERP
studies did not provide direct evidence to link FRN amplitude
with ACC activity. Other neuroimagingmethods with high spatial
resolution are needed to locate the source of FRN more pre-
cisely. Although it is widely believed that the FRN is generated
in the ACC, recent studies show that the sources of the FRN
might be widely distributed (Carlson et al., 2011; Foti et al., 2011).
Second, although we provide evidence that framing influences the
initial option evaluation processes, it is still unclear whether fram-
ing also influences the subsequent decision-making processes.
The interactions among several brain regions may underlie the
effects of framing at the decision stages, and these processes
could be better examined using fMRI. Third, due to the poor
spatial resolution of ERP, our studies are silent about the brain
regions underlying the observed framing effects in the win and
loss domains. Finally, the P300 results were inconsistent across
the two experiments in our study, possibly due to the differ-
ence in the experimental design (blocked vs. mixed). Although
not the focus of the current study, we also reported the P300
findings the sake of completeness. The functional significance of
the P300 in reward processing is still under debate. More studies
are needed to further elucidate the role of the P300 in assessing
outcomes.
People make judgments based on their representations of
events, rather than on the events themselves. Decision making
is not description-invariant, as would be expected on a norma-
tive theory, and hence can change according to the representation
that is provided. In prospect theory, it is the decision maker’s
private framing of the problem in terms of gains or losses that
determines her evaluation of the options. Our findings demon-
strate that framing influences decisions in both the win and the
loss domains and provide neural evidence that the description
invariance principle is violated in the framing effect.
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